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CRITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM NOW
Louis Michael Seidman*
In the fall of 1999, Mark Tushnet published a celebrated foreword to the
Supreme Court edition of the Harvard Law Review arguing that the
Rehnquist Court's decisions could be understood as part of an era marked
by divided government and sharply reduced ambitions for the
transformative potential of constitutional law. 1 Almost exactly two years
later, on September 11, 2001, airplanes crashed into the World Trade
Center. For the next three or four years, Tushnet's characterization of our
times seemed exactly backward: We appeared to be in the middle of an era
of united government and of quite dramatic constitutional transformation.
More recently still, things may have shifted yet again. As I write, in early
fall of 2006, there has emerged a fragile possibility of a Democratic
resurgence coupled with constitutional retrenchment.
I cite these facts not to criticize Tushnet, who has been my constant
friend and mentor and sometimes co-author for over thirty years. The
massive intelligence bureaucracy of the United States government could not
predict the World Trade Center attack, so Tushnet can hardly be blamed for
failing to foresee it and its aftermath. Instead, I cite them to support one of
the great lessons that Tushnet has taught me. The lesson is that we are
always in the middle of things and that meaning, therefore, always extends
backward rather than forward across time. We embed meaning in texts and
events retrospectively, and no actor can control (or at least completely
control) the meaning that subsequent generations will give to her words and
actions.2
Tushnet has famously made this point with regard to court precedent.3
The meaning of judicial decisions cannot be fully discerned at the time they
are decided. Rather, they develop meaning over time as future judges use
the cases-often in quite unexpected ways-for their purposes. If this view
is correct, and I am persuaded that it is, then it should come as no surprise
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. Thanks to Alex Aleinikoff, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Girardeau Spann, Mark
Tushnet, and participants at the Fordham Law School symposium A New Constitutional
Order? for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 29 (1999). For an expanded and updated
version, see Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (2003).
2. For Tushnet's best known articulation of this point, see Mark Tushnet, Following the
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
781, 794-804, 809-15 (1983).
3. See id. at 809-15.
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that the "meaning" of the Rehnquist Court's work was different in 2004
than it was in 1999, and different in 2006 than it was in 2004. Tushnet
created one meaning for Rehnquist jurisprudence that made sense at the
time he wrote, but it is open to us to make something else of that
jurisprudence now, and others will give it still a different meaning in the
future.
The starting point for this essay is the claim that if this is true of the texts
that critical scholars like Tushnet studied, then it must also be true of the
studies themselves. There is no reason to suppose that the critical
perspective, uniquely among all possible perspectives, reflects timeless and
context-less truth. The question I want to ask, then, is what meaning the
critical perspective has for us now in our new and dramatically transformed
environment. I will proceed in four parts. First, I will address the meaning
that critical scholars attributed to constitutional law in the late twentieth
century. Second, I will describe some of the features of the situation that
produced this meaning. Third, I will describe salient features of the current
constitutional situation and how it differs from the situation from which
critical constitutionalism emerged. Finally, I will offer some suggestions
for what critical constitutionalism means today.
I. LAST CENTURY'S CRITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
The emergence of critical legal studies (CLS) was accompanied by a
remarkable outpouring of creativity, energy, and anger. 4 For at least a brief
period, it was at the center of the legal academy. Over a wide range of legal
fields, one simply could not write or think seriously about a subject without
taking some account of the critical (crit) interpretation. 5 Yet critical legal
studies was also a notoriously fractured and amorphous movement. Even in
its heyday, there were some canonical critical texts but few, if any, core,
undisputed tenets. Critical scholars were not only in disagreement among
themselves; their writing was sometimes unnecessarily obscure and
4. For examples of the creativity and energy, see Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical
Legal Studies (1987); The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (David Kairys ed., 3d ed.
1998); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1983); Critical
Legal Studies Symposium, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1984); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble
Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1982).
For bibliographies, see Richard W. Bauman, Critical Legal Studies: A Guide to the
Literature (1996); Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal
Studies, 94 Yale L.J. 461 (1984). For a taste of the anger, see Paul D. Carrington, Of Law
and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984); Calvin Trillin, A Reporter at Large: Harvard
Law, New Yorker, Mar. 26, 1984, at 53.
5. This is not to say that many people did not try. Although they enjoyed parodying
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholarship, see, for example, David L. Shapiro, The Death of
the Up-Down Distinction, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 465 (1984), it is remarkable how little serious
attention many mainstream academics paid to important critical work. For notable
exceptions, see Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (1990); Owen
M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1986).
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polemical, and they were sometimes unwilling to tell outsiders what
implications, if any, their work held for policy on the ground.6
Given its ambiguity, crit scholarship is, perhaps, even more malleable
over time than ordinary texts. Nonetheless, it is possible to isolate some
key features of the comer of critical legal studies that concerned itself with
constitutional law. 7 What follows is a very brief sketch of the central
claims of critical constitutionalism together with an even briefer description
of an internal dispute that arose from these claims.
Most critical constitutional scholars did not distinguish sharply between
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court jurisprudence. Instead, they saw
arguments between liberals8 and conservatives, on the Court and off, as
internal to the mainstream constitutionalism that they rejected. Although
mainstream practice might tilt left or right, it remained defined by a set of
assumptions and constraints that sharply limited its potential. These limits
were captured by the famous crit slogan-powerful, if obviously overly
simple-that law is politics. In their more analytic moods, critical scholars
elaborated on this slogan with two overlapping critiques of standard
constitutional practice-the critique of determinacy and the critique of
rights.
In its narrowest form, the indeterminacy claim was that standard legal
materials-statutes, constitutions, and precedent-often failed to dictate a
single outcome. Critical scholars demonstrated over and over again that
legal rules and conventional methods of interpretation could, in the right
hands, produce wildly different results. 9 Some scholars went beyond this
claim to assert that not just legal materials, but also underlying ideologies,
were indeterminate. On this view, Liberalism itself contained
6. See Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 479 (1995); Kelman, supra
note 4, at 275.
7. I acknowledge a problem in my effort to recover these features. I am writing in the
twenty-first century, so, if my claim about the transitory nature of texts is true, I am
necessarily producing a twenty-first-century version of twentieth century critical legal
studies. I return to this problem at the close of this essay.
8. So as to avoid confusion I will use the word "Liberalism" (capitalized) to refer to
classical Liberalism-that is, a general theory defined by a concern for individual liberties
protected by a rule of law-and "liberalism" (lower case) to refer to the modern political
position.
9. For the classic statement of this proposition in the constitutional context, see
Tushnet, supra note 2. For more recent, generalized restatements, see Duncan Kennedy, A
Critique of Adjudication (fin de sidcle) 60 (1997) ("[T]he whole point of the critique has
been the claim that in many cases in which the ideological stakes are high, legal actors have
had a choice between two (or more) interpretations or definitions of a particular rule, and
that the choice has had the effect of disposing of the ideological stakes."); Mark Tushnet,
Survey Article: Critical Legal Theory (Without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. Pol.
Phil. 99, 108 (2005) ("As critical legal studies developed, bold and overstated claims that all
results were underdetermined were replaced by more defensible ones, to the effect that many
results were underdetermined, or that results in many interesting cases were, or. . . that
enough results were underdetermined to matter.").
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contradictions and ambiguities that could be exploited for radical
purposes. 10
In one sense, the critique of rights was an extension of the indeterminacy
critique. If all legal doctrine was indeterminate, then, obviously, free
speech, equal protection, and due process doctrine was indeterminate as
well. The critical take on rights went beyond arguing for their plasticity,
however. Some critical scholars argued that reliance on legal rights was
harmful. Liberal rights both grew out of, and reinforced, the public-private
distinction at the core of Liberal legal ideology. Liberal rights were almost
always conceptualized as claims by private persons against the state, rather
than as claims to state resources to combat private oppression. Claims to
Liberal rights therefore both ignored and obfuscated the extent to which the
private sphere was, itself, constructed by public decisions. This failure to
detect state responsibility had the effect of taking off the table constitutional
claims to radical redistribution of "private" resources and power."I
Liberal rights were harmful in a second sense as well. The rhetoric of
rights tended to objectify and distort the actual situation in which people
found themselves. Rights were abstract, alienating, and individuating rather
than concrete, liberating, and unifying.' 2 These deficiencies were, in turn,
reinforced by what might be called the "Lucy-and-the-football"
phenomenon. The possibility of vindicating legal rights was endlessly
dangled before the dispossessed. Rights were in fact vindicated frequently
enough so as to keep people in the game. However, the indeterminacy of
rights allowed courts to yank them away just when any truly meaningful
reform seemed within reach. Consequently, endless time and energy were
wasted in the pursuit of legal remedies, when the time might better have
been spent organizing nonlegal popular resistance. 13
As already noted, the critique of determinacy and the critique of rights
reinforced each other. Along another dimension, however, there was
tension between the two arguments, and that tension, in turn, gave rise to a
central fissure within critical legal studies. The tension arises because if
rights are really indeterminate, then it is hard to see how they can also
invariably support the status quo. More generally, how could crits take
Liberal constitutionalism as its enemy if Liberal constitutionalism itself had
no determinate content?
At the risk of considerable oversimplification, it is possible to identify
two competing critical schools that developed in response to this
10. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social
Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685, 721 (1985) ("[T]he absence of essences of words implied
the collapse of the liberal theory of adjudication,... [y]et this idea itself seemed to depend
on a sort of essentialism; after all, it did invoke the 'deep structure' of liberalism.").
11. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact
of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984).
13. See Tushnet, supra note 11.
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challenge-schools that I will label "structural" and "existential." 14 The
structural approach, which has obvious roots in both American Legal
Realism and Marxist legal thought, maintained that legal texts were
indeterminate only insofar as they were separated from economic, social,
and cultural structures that gave them meaning. On this view, it was wrong
to claim that legal actors did not have the subjective sense of being bound
by legal rules or that legal decisions were completely unfettered and,
therefore, unpredictable. On the contrary, legal actors regularly had the
internal perception of constraint, and one could predict with a high degree
of accuracy how particular cases would be resolved. The point, though,
was that this sense of constraint and predictability was not internal to law,
or, at least, not entirely internal to law. Rather, it was the product of
nonlegal structures that determined outcomes regardless of the law's
content.
According to the structural view, then, legal rights were neither good nor
evil when abstracted from a surrounding social environment. Given the
particular structure of our society, they functioned in a certain way, but in
another society with a different structure, they might function very
differently. Indeed, it was even possible that legal consciousness itself
might serve the ends of justice in certain environments. The problem was
that in our environment, it served instead to enforce a deeply unjust status
quo.
The structural theory stands in sharp contrast to the existential view.
Existential theorists were ready to follow the indeterminacy critique all the
way to the bottom. On this view, the supposed structures that gave legal
rules meaning were themselves contingent, indeterminate, and vulnerable.
Surrounding structures sometimes constrain the choices open to legal
actors, but often in ideologically charged cases, the sense of constraint is an
illusion that exists only because of another choice-the choice to hide one's
freedom from oneself. On this view, the status quo remains unchallenged
only because people lack the courage or insight to challenge it.
II. How WE WERE THEN
Because this is an essay about the indeterminate meaning of critical legal
studies itself (a critical take on critical theory, if you will), there is no way
to avoid recursive self-reference. Hence, one must ask whether one should
analyze the meaning of critical legal studies from a structural or existential
perspective, and, of course, that decision itself will either be determined by
a structure or result from unmediated freedom. For now, at least, I want to
avoid this morass by simply asking the reader to accept provisionally a
14. For obvious reasons, these labels are problematic. For a much more careful (and
quite brilliant) taxonomy, see Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 Cardozo L. Rev.
1147 (2001). I have used the word "existential" to describe what Kennedy calls
"decisionist," see id. at 1161-69, while my "structuralism" roughly corresponds to his
"paranoid structuralism." See id. at 1169-75.
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structural approach. In other words, in this section, I want to historicize
critical legal studies by investigating the structures to which it responded in
the past. In the next section, I explore how critical constitutionalism might
have changed its meaning in response to a different set of structures. At the
conclusion of the essay I will reintroduce the conflict between structural
and existential approaches.
What, then, were the features of mid- to late twentieth century
constitutionalism that gave critical constitutionalism determinate content?
The question might be investigated sociologically (in terms of the career
paths and options open to crit academics) or psychoanalytically (in terms of
the unconscious needs to which CLS responded), but for present purposes,
it is productive to think of critical constitutionalism in terms of intellectual
history. From this vantage point, critical constitutionalism made sense of,
and, in turn, was given meaning by, the collapse of reformist liberalism.
One can more or less pinpoint the moment when the collapse began: the
awful spring and summer of 1968, when Lyndon Johnson withdrew from
the presidential race, Martin Luther King and -Robert Kennedy were
assassinated, the urban streets erupted in nihilistic violence, Hubert
Humphrey was nominated for President amidst the stench of tear gas, and
the liberal consensus came unstuck.
Another event in 1968, much less well remembered today, marked a
turning point for the constitutional branch of reformist liberalism. Chief
Justice Earl Warren announced his retirement, and President Johnson
nominated his longtime friend and counselor, Associate Justice Abe Fortas,
to replace Warren as well as another longtime friend, District Judge Homer
Thornberry, to replace Fortas. After a bitter confirmation battle, the Fortas
nomination was blocked in the Senate amid charges of cronyism and
corruption. The result was that Warren served an extra year, and his
replacement was named by the newly elected Richard Nixon rather than
Johnson. Meanwhile, Fortas's troubles only intensified and, within a short
time, a growing scandal forced his resignation as well. 15
This change in the Court's composition both caused, and was caused by,
the collapse of liberal legalism. As a practical matter, the loss of these two
seats ended liberal control of the Court and, with it, the promise of
sweeping, left-leaning reform through the medium of constitutional
adjudication. The departure of Fortas and Warren, however, also had
symbolic significance. Warren, a genial and reform-minded moderate
Republican, was the chief representative of atheoretical and unreflective
liberalism based upon good intentions, sound judgment, and common
sense. 16 His departure symbolized the failure to complete a liberal legal
15. For accounts of these events, see Fred P. Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound (1970);
Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A Biography (1990); Robert Shogan, A Question of Judgment:
The Fortas Case and the Struggle for the Supreme Court (1972).
16. See Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court-A
Judicial Biography 7 (1983) (quoting a contemporary observer listing Warren's outstanding
characteristics as "decency, stability, sincerity, and lack of genuine intellectual distinction").
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project premised on these virtues. Fortas's forced exit suggested the same
failure, but also something much uglier. Fortas had direct ties to the New
Deal and to American Legal Realism, which provided its intellectual
underpinnings. Yet he was also linked to the Vietnam debacle and to the
corruption and cynical manipulation central to the interest group politics
that had arisen in the New Deal's wake. His departure suggested not just
failure, but moral and intellectual bankruptcy as well. 17
Thus, one part of the background structure that supported critical
constitutionalism was the demise of liberal constitutional reformism. There
is another half of the story, however, that proved equally important. It
turned out that conservatives were unready to occupy the space that the
liberals had vacated. Although the Goldwater movement had begun the
process of creating a modem conservative critique of the liberal order, the
effort was still in its infancy and, with regard to constitutional theory, had
not yet even been born. 8 The replacements for Warren and Fortas again
symbolize the nature of the transformation. To be sure, Harry Blackmun,
and, especially Warren Burger were critical of aspects of Warren Court
reformism, particularly with regard to criminal procedure, but neither
Justice had anything like a worked-out conservative constitutional theory.
They pushed the Court marginally to the right on some issues, but the Court
also drifted to the left on others, most prominently, of course, with regard to
abortion and women's rights. Their tenure was famously and accurately
characterized as a "counterrevolution that wasn't." 19
These characteristics of liberal and conservative constitutionalism, in
turn, go a long way toward explaining the emergence and shape of critical
legal studies. Crit scholars responded to the decay of liberal
constitutionalism. The civil rights movement had lost steam, the labor
movement had become conservative and complacent, and the Great Society
had collapsed. In this environment, it is no wonder that the dream of
moderate reform achieved through respect for rule-of-law values lost
credibility. To emerging crit scholars in the 1970s, liberalism seemed
entirely hollowed out, characterized by drift, interest group capture, and a
kind of elitist authoritarianism.
Had liberal reformism been replaced by a coherent conservative
movement, left-leaning scholars might have devoted their energy to
combating that movement. Of course, left-leaning scholars did spend some
time attacking conservatives, especially when intellectually respectable
17. See Shogan, supra note 15, at 262 (quoting contemporary observers as stating that
the Fortas affair was a "staggering blow" to liberalism and that it was "in many ways the
culmination of New Deal liberalism").
18. The key event-the creation of the Federalist Society-did not occur until 1981. See
George W. Hicks, Jr., The Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the Harvard
Law School Student Body, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 623, 647 (2006). The Society was
founded in part because of the perception that conservative legal thought had virtually no
presence at major law schools. See id.
19. The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution that Wasn't (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
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versions of conservative theory-principally law and economics and
originalism-began to make headway in law schools. At the moment when
critical constitutionalism took shape, however, these movements had little
purchase outside the academy. The conservatives who actually made
constitutional law had no unified or coherent vision. The movement, such
as it was, was populated mostly by discredited proponents of states' rights
left over from the civil rights struggle, Frankfurtian fallen-away liberals,
and legal patricians embracing a vaguely Burkean unease regarding the
pace of social change.20
To be sure, there was an ominous shift occurring beneath the surface. By
the 1980s, more sophisticated legal conservatives were beginning to move
out of the academy and into positions of power.21 On the broader stage, the
Democratic Party had begun its secular decline. Even into the 1990s,
however, conservative legal thought had minimal representation on the
Supreme Court, and the long-term descent of the Democratic Party was
masked by two aberrational events: the self-inflicted wound of Watergate,
and the emergence of an obscure Arkansas governor who turned out to have
once-in-a-generation political skills.
Viewed in retrospect, then, it is the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s, rather than
the period beginning in the late 90s, that seem dominated by Tushnet's
divided government/chastened constitutional ambition regime. The earlier
period was marked by the failed nominations of four conservative
candidates for Supreme Court seats, 22 and by only a modest retrenchment
from Warren Court reforms. There was a similar pattern on the broader
political stage. It turned out that the most important fact about Watergate
was not Nixon's attempted coup d'etat, but the gloriously successful
counter-coup mobilized by a powerful opposition in Congress and the
media. Similarly, although conservatives made obvious advances during
the Reagan era, the effort to achieve truly broad-based and lasting change-
on the Supreme Court and elsewhere-were defeated by a still powerful
Congressional opposition and entrenched liberal interest groups.
Given an environment marked by liberal collapse and conservative
hibernation, it is hardly surprising that crit constitutional scholars directed
much of their attention to their liberal opponents. On the one hand, critical
constitutionalism needed to clear away the detritus produced by the liberal
crack-up. Before a fresh start was possible, the self-justificatory illusions of
20. For a good contemporary characterization, see J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel,
the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1971).
21. See Hicks, supra note 18.
22. Clement Haynesworth and G. Harold Carswell (both nominated by President
Richard Nixon in 1969), as well as Robert Bork (nominated by President Ronald Reagan in
1987), were defeated on the Senate floor. Douglas Ginsburg (nominated by President
Reagan after the Bork nomination was defeated) withdrew after it was revealed that he had
used marijuana. See L.A. Powe, Jr., From Bork to Souter, 27 Willamette L. Rev. 781, 784
n.12, 796 (1991).
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legal liberalism had to be dispelled. 23 In the place of the misplaced hope
for top-down reform driven by legal principles, crits held out the promise of
local organization and struggle.
On the other hand, the threat of conservative ascendancy seemed
relatively remote. Importantly, the absence of a conservative threat left
space for crits to attack rule-of-law values. Much of the liberal anger at
critical constitutionalism stemmed from a deep fear that these attacks would
leave the left exposed to conservative power.24 The contemporary response
of critical constitutionalists was to claim that civil liberties protections were
illusory and, indeed, harmful.25  No doubt. crits were honest when they
asserted that they experienced rights claims in this way. Still, from a
historical perspective, it seems likely that the experience was at least
partially grounded in the perception that the conservative threat was puny
and remote.26 In this sense, CLS constitutionalism was parasitic on the
great liberal victory in Watergate, and the more muted triumph fifteen years
later in Iran-Contra. Ironically, these rule-of-law victories provided space
within which crits could safely argue for dismantling the rule of law. So
long as a serious rethinking of constitutional norms from a conservative
perspective was stymied, critical constitutionalists could safely insist on
such a rethinking from a radical perspective.
III. How WE ARE Now
The status of modem critical constitutionalism poses a fascinating
paradox. 27 Events of the last six years provide a stunning confirmation of
the claims critical constitutionalists made during the last century, yet critical
constitutionalism now has less influence than at any time since its
emergence.
Why have crits lost credibility at the very moment when their prophesies
have been vindicated? There are important reasons for the decline that have
nothing to do with the vindication of crit claims. Perhaps the most dramatic
23. There was, no doubt, an Oedipal strain to this impulse. When crits arrived on the
scene, the major law schools were dominated by an entrenched older generation of moderate
liberals. See Robert Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 561, 675 (1983) ("When we came, they were like a priesthood that had lost their faith
and kept their jobs.").
24. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 5.
25. See supra notes 11, 12.
26. As critical race opponents of critical constitutionalism contemporaneously pointed
out, the threat was less remote for more vulnerable groups. See Patricia J. Williams, The
Alchemy of Race and Rights 146-65 (1991). Unsurprisingly, therefore, academic
representatives of these groups found the critique of rights less persuasive. See, e.g., Richard
Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?,
22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301 (1987). See generally Critical Race Theory: The Key
Writings that Formed the Movement (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). For a
contemporary restatement, see Daria Roithmayr, Left Over Rights, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1113
(2001).
27. For an alternative account of the current status of critical legal studies, see Tushnet,
supra note 9, at 99, 108.
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proximate cause was a bitter split between some of the white males who
founded critical legal studies and scholars representing women and people
of color, who felt that the movement was not serving their needs.28 Even
before this schism occurred, CLS, like many left-leaning movements, was
weakened by internecine ideological struggle, sometimes about very
esoteric points of doctrine, and by the failure to produce results on the
ground. Meanwhile, its proponents have grown older and lost energy, and a
new generation has different interests and priorities. 29
In this section, I argue that there is another reason for the decline of
critical constitutionalism that is tied to the accuracy of crit analysis. Put
succinctly, it is just because the crits were right about the disutility of rights
and the indeterminacy of law that critical constitutionalism has become
increasingly irrelevant.
To see why this is so, we must first understand the characteristics of our
new constitutional order and the ways in which those characteristics
vindicate crit claims. The new order is characterized most prominently by
extremely aggressive use of legal argument and rhetoric to cement a system
of one-party government.
Any description of how things are now must give the so-called War on
Terror a prominent place, but it is important to realize that these features
appeared before the planes destroyed the World Trade Center. The first
event of importance occurred almost a year before that attack when the
Supreme Court handed the presidency to George W. Bush.30
Two facts stand out about the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore. First,
although the decision may have been motivated by raw politics, the Court's
opinion was written in the language of legality and rights. Cases were cited
and distinguished, language interpreted, and legal principles applied.
Second, the Republicans got away with it. Defenders of Bush v. Gore are
probably correct when they claim that the Court was able to settle the
election more peaceably and expeditiously than any overtly political
process could have.31 Moreover, the Justices appear to have paid little price
for doing so. 32 The faqade of legality served to legitimate an outcome that
might otherwise have been unacceptable.
28. For identity-based attacks on "mainstream" CLS work, see supra notes 11-12. For a
sense of the tension produced by the attacks, compare Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of
Constitutional Discourse, 81 Geo. L.J. 251 (1992) (criticizing some identity-based
scholarship), with Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 Geo. L.J.
313 (1992) (defending the work), with Mark Tushnet, Reply, 81 Geo. L.J. 343 (1992)
(criticizing the defense).
29. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 103.
30. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the
Constitution, and the Courts (2001).
32. Although the data are ambiguous, there appears to have been a modest decline in
public support for the Court during the Rehnquist years. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The
American Public's Assessment of the Rehnquist Court, 89 Judicature 168 (2005). However,
it is difficult to separate out this decline from the general decline in support for all
institutions of the federal government. Id.
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It is an open question whether this victory would have been lasting had
the September 11 attack never occurred. Once it did occur, though, the
pattern of Bush v. Gore was replicated again and again. In a wide variety of
contexts-from the legal defense of an aggressive war, to the assertion of
constitutional power to hold American citizens indefinitely without legal
process, to the claim that the President has inherent constitutional power to
utilize torture and warrantless wiretapping, to assertions that the filibuster is
unconstitutional and that mid-decade gerrymandering of congressional
districts is constitutionally permissible, to the unprecedented search of the
office of an incumbent congressman-the Bush Administration and its
allies have used legal rhetoric to hold and consolidate power.
Of course, it is a mistake to suppose that this success is entirely internal
to law and legal consciousness. Just as the crits argued, these legal
developments must be understood against the backdrop of the prevailing
political regime. Despite the President's deep unpopularity33 and voting
and polling data showing majority or near-majority support for Democratic
candidates, 34 as of early fall 2006, that regime was entirely dominated by
the Republican party. Not only did Republicans control the presidency;
they had managed to extend that control into the bowels of executive
agencies more effectively than any administration in memory. Similarly,
Republican control over both Houses of Congress extended beyond the
working majority necessary to organize both bodies. For at least the first
four years of the Bush Administration, Republicans voted as a bloc in a
fashion unprecedented since the early New Deal. And, of course,
Republicans controlled a majority of state legislatures and governorships
and, increasingly, the courts.
The importance of this Republican dominance cannot be overstated.
Whereas previous Republican administrations faced push-back in the form
of refusal to enact administration-sponsored legislation, congressional
investigations, adverse court decisions, or revolt within the executive
branch itself, until quite recently, the Bush Administration has been almost
entirely unconstrained.
What explains this power imbalance? It is certainly not explainable by
anything resembling a broad-based popular mandate. Bush has never had
such a mandate. 35 Some of it is attributable to the winner-take-all features
33. As of October 2006, Gallup reported that thirty-seven percent of Americans
approved of President George W. Bush, and fifty-nine percent disapproved. These figures
are similar to those generated by other polling organizations. See PollingReport.com,
President Bush-Overall Job Rating, http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2006).
34. For example, as of October 8, 2006, Gallup showed fifty-nine percent of its
respondents favoring Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives and thirty-six
percent favoring Republican candidates. See PolingReport.com, Election 2006,
http://www.pollingreport.com/2006a.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
35. George W. Bush lost the popular vote to Al Gore in 2000 and won the popular vote
against John Kerry by a scant three million votes out of some 121 million cast. See
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of the American political system and to a combination of Republican
discipline and Democratic fecklessness. A large contributing factor is the
War on Terror itself. The Bush administration has masterfully deployed
and prolonged the "rally effect" produced by the Afghan and Iraqi wars. 36
Finally, there is a feedback loop, whereby the Bush legal strategy reinforces
its political dominance, which, in turn, protects the legal strategy from
attack. Thus, Bush v. Gore, the confident assertion of executive
constitutional authority to stymie a congressional check, the virtual
elimination of competitive congressional districts, and the threat to declare
the filibuster unconstitutional have all served to create and entrench
Republican political control, which, in turn, has protected Republican legal
strategy.
Although they can take small comfort from the fact, this complex
interaction of legal consciousness with politics vindicates the key claims of
critical constitutionalists. 37  It turns out that constitutional principle is
sufficiently elastic to accommodate easily the Bush revolution, at least
when it interacts with one party political control. To be sure, liberals will
complain that, for example, the Bush v. Gore decision or the Office of Legal
Counsel's torture rulings38 amount to a perversion of, rather than respect
for, the rule of law. Without question, the legal reasoning in these
documents is something of a stretch. In fairness, though, it is hard to say
that they involve more of a stretch than celebrated liberal legal victories like
Roe v. Wade39 or Brown v. Board of Education.40 Just as liberals did under
the old regime, Republican lawyers have managed to dress up political
outcomes in rhetoric that is within the domain (albeit perhaps barely) of
recognizable, competent legal argument. Indeed, they have demonstrated
Infoplease, Presidential Elections 1789-2004, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781450.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
36. See Marc J. Hetherington & Michael Nelson, Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W.
Bush and the War on Terrorism, PS: Political Science & Politics, April 2003, at 37
(reporting the September 11 th rally effect as the largest and longest sustained of all recorded
rally effects).
37. For an elaboration of this point in the context of Bush v. Gore, see Jack M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The Roles of Law Professors in
the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 Geo. L.J. 173 (2001).
38. See Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801 .pdf.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 820 ("It seems to be
generally agreed that, as a matter of simple craft, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court
was dreadful.").
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Consider, for example, the statement of Justice Robert Jackson
(who ultimately joined the unanimous Brown v. Board of Education opinion) to his
colleagues after the first Brown argument: "[There is] [n]othing in the text that says this is
unconstitutional. [There is] nothing in the opinions of the courts that says it's
unconstitutional. Nothing in the history of the 14th amendment [says it's unconstitutional].
On [the] basis of precedent [I] would have to say segregation is ok." Michael J. Klarman,
From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality
296 (2004) (quoting an early draft of Justice Jackson's concurrence in Brown).
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that the domain itself is not fixed, but can be moved by the very fact that
powerful legal actors are willing to advance arguments previously thought
out-of-bounds. They have, in short, used legal reasoning to do exactly what
crits claim legal reasoning always does-put the lipstick of disinterested
constitutionalism on the pig of raw politics.
Ironically, it is just this vindication of critical constitutionalism that
disables it from responding to the current crisis. Recall that in the previous
century, critical constitutionalism filled a vacuum left when conservative
legal thought failed to take advantage of the disintegration of reformist
liberalism. Rights skepticism made sense in this environment because the
risk of serious oppression from a still immature rightist movement was very
small.
The world today has been radically transformed. There is no longer a
need to discredit liberal reformism to make room for a fresh start. For the
present, at least, there is no liberal reformism to discredit, and the prospect
of a fresh start is vanishingly small. On the other hand, there is a very real
threat of rightist repression. To put the point baldly, we are one more terror
attack away from a complete remaking of our political culture. 4 1
In this environment, the crucial question for left constitutionalists is how
to stop the slide into authoritarianism. Very recently, there have been some
encouraging signs, but, importantly, some of them stem from increasing
apprehension among liberals and some traditional conservatives concerning
rule-of-law values. After four years during which Republican unity across
branches of government mocked James Madison's hope that "ambition
would counter ambition," the judicial and legislative branches have
tentatively begun to assert their constitutional authority. Thus, even some
conservative Justices on the Supreme Court rejected Bush Administration
claims that it could indefinitely hold American citizens as enemy
combatants without meaningful procedures or access to courts.42  In
Congress, growing coalitions of liberals and conservatives have attacked
the Bush Administration's assertion of unilateral authority to disregard
wiretapping laws43 and torture prisoners. 4
4
41. For a convincing explication of this point, together with a less-than-convincing (to
this reader at least) proposal for what to do about it, see Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next
Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (2006).
42. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
43. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Chairman Splits with Bush on Spy Program, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 2006, at Al ("The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee
[Republican Pat Roberts] said Friday that he wanted the Bush administration's domestic
eavesdropping program brought under the authority of a special intelligence court, a move
President Bush has argued is not necessary.").
44. See Eric Schmitt, House Defies Bush and Backs McCain on Detainee Torture, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 15, 2005, at A14 ("In an unusual bipartisan rebuke to the Bush administration,
the House ... overwhelmingly endorsed Senator John McCain's measure to bar cruel and
inhumane treatment of prisoners in American custody anywhere in the world."); see also
Carl Hulse, House Leaders Demand Return of Seized Files, N.Y. Times, May 25, 2006, at
Al ("The constitutional clash pitting Congress against the executive branch escalated
Wednesday as the Republican and Democratic leaders of the House demanded the
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These cracks in the Bush legal strategy magnify, and are magnified by,
changes in the political climate. Bush's lame duck status, his reaction to the
Hurricane Katrina disaster, the failure of Social Security reform, the endless
chaos in Iraq, and abysmal poll numbers are all contributing to the
unraveling. Of course, the danger has not passed. The Bush
Administration has demonstrated remarkable resilience, and, as noted
above, another terror attack could yet change everything.
The short of it, then, is that we are at a critical and delicate moment, a
moment at which, it would seem, nothing could be more ill-advised than
launching a frontal attack on the rule of law. At first, this may seem
paradoxical. If constitutionalism has provided the cover for creeping
authoritarianism, as I have claimed above, how can it be that it is also part
of the solution? The paradox is resolved as soon as one rejects the Liberal
faith that the content of constitutionalism is internal to law. Precisely
because it is not, constitutionalism can be put to a variety of contradictory
uses in different environments. Thus, crits will say, Liberal
constitutionalists are deluded in thinking that legal consciousness itself
provides a bulwark against all that is evil in the world. Sometimes, though,
it is wise to indulge the delusions of others, especially when one is trying to
keep together a fragile coalition and when those delusions motivate
coalition partners to stay on the right side of a vital struggle.
IV. WHAT DOES CRITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM MEAN Now?
What meaning are we to give critical constitutionalism in this new and
very dangerous environment? In answering this question, I want to return
to the internal debate between critical structuralists and existentialists that
emerged during the last century. Thinking about that debate, in turn, allows
us to break out of the structural frame of this essay itself.
From a structural perspective, the modem meaning of critical
constitutionalism is relatively clear. Structuralists always believed that the
meaning and utility of rights depended upon background structure. Thus,
the fact that rights discourse was harmful in the last century does not mean
that is harmful in this century. If law is, indeed, politics, then the value of
legal rhetoric will change as the underlying political situation shifts. It
follows that even though critical constitutionalism meant rights skepticism
and rule indeterminacy in the last century, it means rights consciousness
and legal formalism now. There is no contradiction because legal meaning
as well as the meaning of critical constitutionalism itself are determined by
structure.
From the existential perspective, there are two important problems with
assigning this meaning to modern critical constitutionalism. First,
structuralism threatens norms of publicity and authenticity in ways that
immediate return of materials seized by federal agents when they searched the office of a
House member who is under investigation in a corruption case.").
[Vol. 75
CRITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM NOW
bring back uncomfortable memories of the "popular front" movement in the
1930s. Recall that the coalition with liberals and legal-minded
conservatives is built on the illusion that law transcends politics-that it is
autonomous and politically neutral. Of course, their crit allies believe
nothing of the kind. They favor law because, and to the extent that, it
serves contestable political purposes. But law can serve these political
purposes only so long as"it masquerades as apolitical. Thus, a critical
constitutionalist who joins liberals and conservatives on this basis must
systematically misrepresent her true beliefs. For her political program to be
successful, she must persuade others to believe in a contextless and
permanent meaning to, and value of, law that she herself rejects.
For a thoroughgoing structuralist, perhaps this is not a problem.
Authenticity, itself, always exists within a structure. Structuralists will
claim that in some environments it is a virtue, while in others it is not. But
surely there is a difficulty here. Even if the virtue of law is not structure-
independent, the virtue of authenticity, if indeed it is a virtue, must be.
What it means to be authentic is to represent one's true self to oneself and
to the outside world. Are structuralists to have us believe that there is no
true self to be represented-that it is structures all the way down? Perhaps,
and perhaps they are even right on this score. But if there is no true self,
then there can be no commitments that the self is capable of making and,
so, no fights worth fighting.45 What, after all, is the point of a political
coalition to combat Bush authoritarianism if there is no self capable of
forming a commitment to combat it?
There is also a second way in which structuralism eats its own tail. If
structuralism is right, then the analysis of the existing structure must, itself,
be located within a structure. And if this is true, then the analysis has no
independent truth value. The example of Tushnet's 1999 description of the
new constitutional order reminds us that our vision is always and inevitably
located,, and this should serve as a useful caution. Tushnet's analysis of the
forces in play was, itself, a product of those forces and, with different forces
in play now, the analysis is very different. Of course, if this was true for
Tushnet in 1999, then it must also be true of the analysis in this essay. The
description of our current order is the best I can do, right now, to make
sense of our situation, but the situation is fluid and any meaning assigned to
current events must be transient and contextual. Things will no doubt seem
very different seven years from now just as they seemed different seven
years ago. If it is indeed structures all the way down, then how are we to
make sense of our current situation and how are we to formulate strategies
to deal with it?
The existential strand of critical constitutionalism has answers to these
questions, although it also generates some new questions of its own. For an
existentialist crit, structures are like law itself in the sense that they produce
45. For some nervous ruminations along these lines, see William Ian Miller, Faking It
233-34 (2003).
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a false sense of constraint and serve to alienate people from the possibility
of their own freedom. Whatever structuralists tell us, it is just a fact that we
do have authentic selves and that we retain the possibility of choice.
Structures do not produce determinate, predictable, and inevitable outcomes
any more than law does. Everything is contingent and depends on how
human beings choose to respond to the environment in which they find
themselves.
An existential approach is attractive because it liberates us from the iron
grip of structuralism and emphasizes the possibilities of freedom and
choice. Unfortunately, though, it does so at the cost of eliminating the very
question we are attempting to address. Should crit constitutionalists join
their liberal and conservative allies in making rule-of-law arguments or not?
Existentialist thought cannot answer this question because existentialists
deny the possibility that any argument or set of reasons can dictate any
outcome. Worse yet, an existential approach removes the motivation for
asking the question in the first place. On the existential view of things,
critical constitutionalism itself cannot dictate any outcome. Asking what
stance critical constitutionalists should take supposes that by affiliating with
this movement or body of thought, one has thereby committed oneself to a
certain course of action that, given the commitment, is necessary and
inevitable. But this is just what existentialists want to deny.46 For them,
choice is always possible, and the belief that critical constitutionalism
forces us to behave in a certain way is just as delusional as the belief that
the rule of law requires certain action.
But although an existentialist cannot exactly defend an argument dictated
by an approach that emphasizes the inability of argument to dictate
anything, perhaps she can explain a certain sensibility. It might be, as well,
that this sensibility will play out differently in our environment than it did
in the last century. In the remainder of this essay, I attempt to describe this
sensibility, to explain why I find it attractive, and to offer some suggestions
for how it intersects with our current situation.
I begin by expressing my own unease in affiliating myself with a view
that the rule of law dictates or requires resistance to the Bush revolution.
Arguments along these lines amount to a claim that people are somehow
obligated to adopt certain political positions whether they want to or not.
Put concretely, these arguments claim that even if someone reaches an all-
things-considered judgment that, say, the Guantanamo detentions are the
right thing to do, one is nonetheless required to oppose them because they
violate the law.
Properly understood, this position is both authoritarian and obfuscatory.
Instead of treating people as free and autonomous grown-ups, it treats them
46. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal
Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 236
(1984) (arguing that critical legal scholars risk becoming frozen in their own critical
methods).
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as children who must be bullied or tricked into compliance. I believe the
Bush revolution should be resisted precisely because it is authoritarian and
obfuscatory, and I therefore feel uncomfortable using these means to
dislodge it. Of course, a thoroughgoing existentialist cannot claim that
some transcendent principle prevents this sort of duplicity. All I can (and
do) claim is that I am uncomfortable with it.
Does this mean that it is impossible for modem crits with similar
sensibilities to form alliances with rule-of-law liberals and conservatives? I
do not think so. It is at this point that our changed situation might cause us
to understand critical constitutionalism somewhat differently. Critical
constitutionalism in the twentieth century was often marked by a kind of
brash in-your-faceism. In fairness to crits, at least some of this rhetoric was
defensive after others had struck the first blow, and some was perhaps
necessary to shake up a sleepy constitutional establishment. In any event,
whether because we are all older and wiser, or whether because the
situation has changed, this rhetoric does not seem necessary now.
Indeed, viewed from our current environment, it is possible to see how
the "real" meaning of critical constitutionalism leads to a kind of tolerant
acceptance of rival points of view. The indeterminacy of rules and the
unconstrained possibility of choice mean that no views are permanently and
necessarily out-of-bounds. I may see the world one way today, but how am
I to know that I will not see it differently tomorrow? And if I, myself,
might change my views tomorrow, how can I despise you for holding the
views that I might tomorrow embrace?
This kind of skeptical tolerance, I think, provides a basis for coalition.
For me, the Bush revolution is bad not because it violates the rule of law,
but because it is creating a country that I do not want to live in. I cannot
prove it, but my hunch is that this is really what motivates many rule-of-law
liberals and conservatives as well. It is just that they attach the rule-of-law
label to their preferences. If I am right about this, then I wish they would
stop using these words, but a problem with labels should not get in the way
of joining together in a crucial struggle. Even if I am wrong, an existential
crit cannot claim that there is some permanent, fixed, and inevitable force
that prevents one from choosing to value the rule of law. This is not my
choice, but, in my new, tolerant mood, I can see no reason why I should
shun you just because it is yours.
Of course, the move toward toleration itself produces well-known
problems. If there is precisely nothing preventing me from choosing to
become a rule-of-law liberal or conservative, then there is also precisely
nothing preventing me from becoming a Bush revolutionary. In this way,
eventually, when we become old enough and wise enough, the meaning of
critical constitutionalism may morph yet again into a kind of placid,
passive, and deeply disempowering, acceptance of any status quo.
I must say that, from my present perspective, I find this possibility deeply
unsettling. Fortunately (or at least so it seems to me at present) I am not yet
that old and that wise. It follows that, for me at least, this is not the
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meaning of critical constitutionalism now. It is fortunate as well that
possible meanings that might be assigned to critical constitutionalism in the
future are beyond the scope of this essay.
